I discuss a hypothetical historical context in which a Bohm-like deterministic interpretation of the Schrödinger equation could have been proposed before the Born probabilistic interpretation and argue that in such a context the Copenhagen (Bohr) interpretation would probably have never achieved great popularity among physicists.
Introduction
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) was the first interpretation of QM that achieved a significant recognition among physicists. It was proposed very early by the fathers of QM, especially Bohr and Heisenberg. Later, many other interpretations of QM were proposed, such as statistical ensemble interpretation, Bohm (pilot wave) interpretation, Nelson (stochastic dynamics) interpretation, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (spontaneous collapse) interpretation, quantum logic interpretation, information theoretic interpretation, consistent histories interpretation, many-world (relative state) interpretation, relational interpretation, etc. All these interpretations seem to be consistent with experiments, as well as with the minimal pragmatic "shut-up-and-calculate interpretation". Nevertheless, apart from the minimal pragmatic interpretation, the Copenhagen interpretation still seems to be the dominating one. Is it because this interpretation is the simplest, the most viable, and the most natural one? Or is it just because of the inertion of pragmatic physicists who do not want to waste much time on (for them) irrelevant interpretational issues, so that it is the simplest for them to (uncritically) accept the interpretation to which they were exposed first? I believe that the second answer is closer to truth. To provide an argument for that, in this essay I argue that if some historical circumstances had been only slightly different, then it would have been very likely that the Bohm deterministic interpretation would have been proposed and accepted first, and consequently, that this interpretation would have been dominating even today. (In fact, if the many-world interpretation taken literally is correct, then such an alternative history of QM is not hypothetical at all. Instead, it is explicitly realized in many branches of the whole multi-universe containing a huge number of parallel universes. A similar remark is true for the consistent-histories interpretation as well.) For the sake of easier reading, in the next section I no longer use the conditional, but present an alternative hypothetical history of QM as if it really happened, trying to argue that such an alternative history was actually quite natural.
1 Although a prior knowledge on the Bohm deterministic interpretation is not required here, for readers unfamiliar with this interpretation I suggest to read also the original paper [1] or a recent pedagogic review [2] .
An alternative history of quantum mechanics
When Schrödinger discovered his wave equation, the task was to find an interpretation of it. The most obvious interpretation -that electrons are simply waves -was not consistent because it was known that electrons behave as pointlike particles in many experiments. Still, it was known that electrons also obey some wave properties. What was the most natural interpretation of that? Of course, the notion of "naturalness" is highly subjective and strongly depends on personal knowledge, prejudices, and current paradigms. At that time, classical deterministic physics was well understood and accepted, so it was the most natural to try first with an interpretation that maximally resembles the known principles of classical mechanics. In particular, classical mechanics contains only real quantities, so it was very strange that the Schrödinger equation discrabes a complex wave. Consequently, it was natural to rewrite the Schrödinger equation in terms of real quantities only. The simplest way to do this was to write the complex wave function ψ in the polar form ψ = Re iφ and then to write the complex Schrödinger equation as a set of two (coupled) real equations for R(x, t) and φ(x, t). However, such a simple mathematical manipulation did not immediately reveal the physical interpretation of R and φ. Fortunately, a physical interpretation has revealed very soon, after an additional mathematical transformation
where S is some new function. The Schrödinger equation for ψ rewritten in terms of R and S turns out to look remarkably similar to something very familiar from classical mechanics. One equation looks similar to the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the function S(x, t), differing from it only by a transformation
where V is the classical potential and
The other equation turns out to look exactly as the continuity equation
for the density ρ ≡ R 2 , with the Hamilton-Jacobi velocity
Thus, at that moment, the most natural interpretation of the phase of the wave function seemed to be a quantum version of the Hamilton-Jacobi function that determines the velocity of a pointlike particle. But what was ρ? Since one of the equations looks just as the continuity equation, at the beginning it was proposed that ρ was the density of particles. That meant that the Schrödinger equation described a fluid consisting of a huge number of particles. The forces on these particles depended not only on the classical potential V , but also on the density ρ through the quantum potential (3) in which R = √ ρ.
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Although the interpretation above seemed appealing theoretically, it was very soon realized that it was not consistent with experiments. It could not explain why, in experiments, only one localized particle at a single position was often observed. Thus, ρ could not be the density of a fluid. It seemed that ρ (or R) must be an independent continuous field, qualitatively similar to an electromagnetic or a gravitational field, that, similarly to an electromagnetic or a gravitational field, influences the motion of a particle. But why does ρ satisfy the continuity equation, what is the meaning of this? They could not answer this question, but they were able to identify a physical consequence of the continuity equation. To see this, assume that one studies a statistical ensemble of particles with the probability distribution of particle positions equal to some function p(x, t). Assume also that, for some reason, the initial distribution at t = 0 coincides with the function ρ at t = 0. Then the continuity equation implies that
at any t. But why should these two functions coincide initially? Although nobody was able to present an absolutely convincing explanation, at least some heuristic arguments were found, based on statistical arguments. 3 This suggested that, in typical experiments, ρ could be equal to the measured probability density of particle positions. Indeed, it turned out that such a prediction agrees with experiments. Since this prediction was derived from the natural assumption that each particle has the velocity determined by (5), it was concluded that experiments confirm (5). Thus, this interpretation became widely accepted and received the status of an "orthodox" interpretation.
However, not everybody was satisfied with this interpretation. In particular, Born objected that there was no direct experimental evidence for the particle velocities as given by (5), so this assumption was questioned by him. As an alternative, he proposed a different interpretation. In his interpretation, the equality (6) was a fundamental postulate. Thus, he avoided a need for particle velocities as given by (5) . However, his interpretation has not been widely accepted among physicists. The arguments against the Born interpretation were the following: First, this ad hoc postulate could not explain why the probability density was given by ρ. Second, a theory in which the probabilistic interpretation was one of the fundamental postulates was completely against all current knowledge about fundamental laws of physics. The classical deterministic laws were well established, so it was more natural to accept a deterministic interpretation of QM that only slightly differs from classical mechanics. Third, it was observed that if one used the arguments of Born to argue that QM is to be interpreted probabilistically, then one could use analogous arguments to argue that even classical mechanics should be interpreted probabilistically, 5 which seemed absurd.
Although the Born purely probabilistic interpretation was not considered very appealing, mainly owing to the overwhelming mechanicistic view of physics of that time, it was appreciated by some positivists that such an interpretation should not be excluded. The Born interpretation was quite radical, but still acceptable as a possible alternative. However, one version of the Born interpretation was much more radical, in fact too radical to be taken seriously. This new interpretation was suggested by Bohr. In fact, Bohr was already known in the physics community by proposing the famous Bohr model of the hydrogen atom, in which electrons move circularly at discrete distances from the nucleus. Now a much better model of the hydrogen atom (the one based on the Schrödinger equation and particle trajectories that it predicts) was known, so the Bohr model was no longer considered that important, although it still enjoyed a certain respect. Since the model by which Bohr achieved respect among physicists was based on particle trajectories, it was really a surprise when Bohr in his new interpretation proposed that particle trajectories did not exist at all. But this was not the most radical part of his interpretation. The most radical part was the following: he proposed that it did not even make sense to talk about particle properties unless these properties were measured. An immediate argument against such a proposal was the well-established classical mechanics, in which particle properties clearly existed even without measurements. Bohr argued that there was a separation between the microscopic quantum world and the macroscopic classical world, so that the measurement-independent properties made sense only in the latter. However, Bohr never explained how and where this separation took place. In his interpretation, he introduced no new equation. His arguments were considered pure philosophy, not physics. Thus, it is not a surprise that his interpretation has never been taken seriously. His interpretation was soon forgotten. (Much later it was found that the mechanism of decoherence through the interaction with the environment provides a sort of dynamical separation between "classical" and "quantum" worlds, but this separation was not exactly what Bohr suggested.
6 ) Another prominent physicist who criticized the orthodox interpretation of QM was 5 Such arguments might have looked similar to those in [6] . 6 For a review of the theory of decoherence with emphasis on the interpretational issues, see [7] .
Einstein. He liked the determinism of orthodox QM, but there was something else that was bothering him. According to the orthodox interpretation, entangled spacially separated particles communicate instantaneously. He argued that this is in contradiction with his theory of relativity, because he derived that no signal can exceed the velocity of light. Orthodox quantum physicists admitted that this is a problem for their interpretation, but soon they have found a solution. They observed that the geometric formulation of relativity does not really exclude superluminal velocities, unless some additional properties of matter are assumed. Thus, they introduced the notion of tachyons 7 , hypothetical particles that can move faster than light and still obey the geometrical principles of relativity. Einstein admitted that tachyons are consistent with relativity, but he objected that this is not sufficient to solve the problem of instantaneous communication. If the communication is instantaneous, then it can be so only in one reference frame. This means that there must be a preferred reference frame with respect to which the communication is instantaneous, which again contradicts the principle of relativity according to which all reference frames should enjoy the same rights. At that time orthodox quantum physicists understood relativity sufficiently well to appreciate that Einstein was right. On the other hand, the theory of relativity was also sufficiently young at that time, so that it did not seem too heretic to modify or reinterpret the theory of relativity itself. It was observed that with a preferred foliation of spacetime specified by a fixed timelike vector n µ one can still write all quantum equations in a relativistic covariant form. It was also observed that, by using an analogy with nonrelativistic fluids, relativity may correspond only to a low-energy approximation of a theory with a fundamental preferred time.
8 Thus, it was clear that the preferred foliation of spacetime does not necessarily contradict the theory of relativity, provided that the theory of relativity is viewed as an effective theory.
As quantum physics made further progress, it became clear that many theories that were considered fundamental at the beginning turned out to be merely effective theories. This reinforced the dominating paradigm according to which relativity is also an effective, approximative theory. Nevertheless, some relativists still believed that the principle of relativity was a fundamental principle. Consequently, they were not satisfied with the orthodox interpretation of QM that requires a preferred foliation of spacetime. Instead they were trying to interpret QM in a completely local and relativistic manner. To do that, they were forced to introduce some rather radical views of nature. In one way or another, they were forced to assume that a single objective reality did not exist.
9 However, such radical interpretations were not very appreciated by the mainstream physicists. It did not seem reasonable to crucify one of the cornerstones not only of physics but of the whole science (the existence of objective reality) just to save one relatively new theoretical principle (the principle of locality and relativity) for which there existed good evidence that it could be only an approximative principle.
10 Therefore, the deterministic interpretation of QM survived as the dominating paradigm, while the probabilistic rules of QM, used widely in practical phenomenological calculations, were considered emergent, not fundamental. In fact, it has been found that, in some cases, the probabilistic rules cannot be derived in a simple way, so that one is forced to use the fundamental fully 7 In reality, tachyons have been introduced in physics somewhat later, see [8] . 8 See, e.g., [9] . 9 Many of the current interpretations of QM mentioned in the introduction are of this form. 10 String theory also contains evidence against locality at the fundamental level, see, e.g., [10, 11] . deterministic theory explicitly. 11 
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that, in the context of scientific paradigms that were widely accepted when the Schrödinger equation was discovered, it was much more natural to propose and accept the Bohmian deterministic interpretation than the Copenhagen interpretation. I have also argued that, if that had really happened, then the Bohmian interpretation (or a minor modification of it) would have been a dominating view even today. In other words, the answer to the allegoric tongue-twisting question posed in the title of this paper is -probably no! This, of course, does not prove that the Bohmian interpretation is more likely to be correct than some other interpretation. But the point is that it really seems surprising that the history of QM chose a path in which the Copenhagen interpretation became much more accepted than the Bohmian one. I leave it to the sociologists and historians of science to explain why the history of QM chose the path that it chose.
